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Abstract 
 
This study examines two sets of issues in connection with SFAS No. 142, Goodwill and Other 
Intangible Assets. The first is whether managers use discretion in determining the transitional 
goodwill impairment loss (initial impairment loss or IIL) in a strategic manner. The second is 
whether and how the market reacts to a disclosed impairment loss and to the absence of goodwill 
amortization. I find that more highly leveraged firms have a lower goodwill impairment charge, 
which is consistent with the strategic reduction of the goodwill impairment by management to 
avoid the violation of debt covenants. I also find that firms that have undergone recent 
management changes report greater impairment charges, which is reflective of the notion that 
new managers take a big bath so that they can report higher earnings in the future. Regarding the 
market response, evidence shows that the stock return is negatively associated with an 
unexpected IIL, with the association being stronger for highly leveraged firms, and that 
subsequent to the IIL announcement, analysts revise their forecasts of the upcoming quarters’ 
earnings downward in response to an unanticipated IIL. These findings are interpreted as 
evidence that an unexpected IIL provides value-relevant information about a negative view of 
the future profit-making potential of a firm or an adverse impact on its debt contracts. In contrast, 
the return is not associated with the absence of goodwill amortization, which can be interpreted 
as the market’s anticipation and adjustment or the lack of information content in goodwill 
amortization. This research helps better understand the importance of managers’ incentives in 
determining IIL as well as the stock market effect of the announcement of the IIL and the 
exclusion of goodwill amortization.  
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I.    Introduction 
After many years of controversy, the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) finally issued 
Statements 141 and 142 on July 20, 2001. The two statements made significant changes in the accounting 
rules for business combinations and goodwill. The Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 
No. 141, Business Combinations eliminates the use of pooling-of-interests method and allows only 
purchase method for business combinations. SFAS No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets 
requires that goodwill and intangible assets with indefinite useful lives cease to be amortized, and that a 
transitional goodwill impairment test in the adoption year and an annual impairment test in subsequent 
years be performed.1  
This paper examines two research questions with respect to the adoption of SFAS No. 142. The first is 
whether managers manipulate the transitional goodwill impairment loss (Initial Impairment Loss, or IIL 
hereafter), and if so, then what motivates the manipulation. The second is how a firm’s stock price 
responds to the announcement of the IIL and a boost in earnings caused by the elimination of goodwill 
amortization. 
The investigation of earnings management is motivated by the flexibility that management has in 
determining the initial writing-off of goodwill as a result of the adoption of SFAS No. 142 because the 
rule requires a significant amount of judgment by managers, especially in the adoption year.  One 
example of such judgment is the allocation of goodwill to reporting units. Although SFAS No. 142 calls 
for a “reasonable and supportable” approach (SFAS No. 142 paragraph 32-35), managers can use 
subjective judgment in assigning goodwill to reporting units because if a business combination provides 
synergies and benefits to other operations, managers can assign some of its goodwill into other reporting 
units. Thus, if managers want to write off a large amount of goodwill in the adoption year (as might be the 
case if they are looking to take a big bath), they may allocate goodwill into the reporting units for which 
                                                 
1The previous rule, APB No. 17, presumed that goodwill and other intangibles were wasting assets (that is, with 
finite lives), and thus the amounts that were assigned to them were amortized over a maximum of 40 years. Under 
the new rule, intangible assets with finite useful lives will continue to be amortized over their useful lives, but 
without the constraint of an arbitrary ceiling. 
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the implied fair value of the goodwill (that is, the fair value of the reporting unit minus the fair value of 
net identifiable assets in the unit) is small. In contrast, if managers want to have little or no impairment in 
the adoption year, they may allocate as much goodwill as possible to reporting units where an implied fair 
value of goodwill is sufficiently high to pass the impairment test.  
Using a sample of 870 firms that completed a transitional goodwill impairment test in the adoption 
year, this study investigates whether two managerial discretionary variables – firm leverage and change in 
management – explain cross-sectional variations in the IIL after controlling for the actual economic 
impairment of goodwill, as proxied by variables such as industry, size, the characteristics of goodwill, and 
past asset or stock performance.   
This study first predicts that as a firm nears its debt covenant constraints, its managers will be more 
likely to use their discretion to understate the IIL and thus create a debt covenant slack.  Because a large 
IIL charge could tighten or cause the violation of the constraints of debt covenants, firms with a higher 
leverage may be more reluctant to report a large IIL charge if leverage proxies for the existence and 
tightness of debt covenants. The second prediction is that a greater IIL charge will be recorded by firms 
that have undergone recent changes in management than by firms in which no such changes have 
occurred. New managers may tend to overstate the IIL in the transitional period of management change 
because by doing so they can reduce a possibility of future goodwill impairment that will be charged 
against operating earnings. The empirical results are consistent with the two predictions, suggesting that 
the discretionary behavior of managers plays a role in determining the amount of the IIL.  
This study next examines the behavior of the security prices upon the disclosure of the IIL charges 
and the elimination of goodwill amortization. The adoption of SFAS No. 142 has two significant effects 
on a firm’s earnings: it reduces earnings if firms recognize the goodwill impairment loss, and increases 
earnings as goodwill amortization is eliminated.2  In event-study framework, I analyze the market effects 
of these two.  Clearly, the IIL charge is a challenge for investors in assessing a firm’s performance and 
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value because it is a bookkeeping adjustment that does not coincide with changes in the value of tangible 
assets or cash flows. The elimination of goodwill amortization may also confuse investors in their 
assessment of firm value, especially in the adoption year, because the new accounting standard helps 
firms with a substantial amount of goodwill to report a jump in earnings, and because the market might 
not be able to distinguish the cosmetic changes in earnings caused by the new standard from other 
changes in earnings. 
I predict that unanticipated IIL charges may have a significant and negative impact on stock prices, 
and provide two possible explanations: “signaling” and “contracting costs.” “Signaling” suggests the 
conveyance of the private information of managers to the market, in that an unanticipated IIL charge 
reveals a situation that is worse than expected by investors and thus changes the market’s expectation of a 
firm’s future cash flows and risk. “Contracting costs” indicates that an unexpected IIL may have an 
adverse impact on the debt contracts and other contracts of a firm (Watts and Zimmerman 1990).  For 
example, if lowered earnings caused by an unanticipated IIL result in more binding debt covenants and 
further lead to sub-optimal firm decisions, then the unanticipated IIL will cause a decline in market price. 
However, I predict no market reaction to a boost in earnings resulted from the elimination of goodwill 
amortization, because this is a purely cosmetic and anticipated accounting number change that rational 
investors should be able to see through. 
Overall, the empirical results reveal evidence consistent with these predictions. Although stock 
returns have no significant association with an expected IIL or the elimination of amortization, they are 
negatively associated with an IIL charge that is greater than expected, with the negative association being 
stronger for more highly leveraged firms. Further analysis shows that subsequent to the IIL 
announcement, analysts revise their earnings forecasts for the upcoming quarter downward.  This result is 
interpreted as evidence that an unexpected IIL charge conveys value-relevant information such as a 
negative view of future operations or adverse effects on a firm’s debt contracts.  
                                                                                                                                                             
2One of the biggest IIL charges was AOL Time Warner’s 54 billion-dollar charge (26% of its total assets) in the 
fiscal year of 2002. Had AOL Time Warner adopted SFAS 142 in 2001, its basic earnings per common share would 
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This study contributes to the earnings management literature by examining the discretionary behavior 
of managers in determining the amount of their IIL upon the adoption of SFAS No. 142. The FASB 
contends that the benefit of writing down goodwill on an impairment basis, rather than on the basis of an 
arbitrary and systematic amortization, is that firms will be more transparent to investors regarding the 
economic value of goodwill and the extent of its impact on earnings. However, this purported benefit will 
be mitigated if managers use discretion opportunistically to mislead stakeholders about the underlying 
economic value of goodwill. The results of this study will help accounting users to understand the 
opportunistic behavior by managers and its effect on financial statements.   
In addition, this study provides new insight into research on the information content of asset write-
offs. Three previous studies examine the information content of goodwill write-offs in the pre-SFAS No. 
142 period and reveal inconsistent results. Whereas Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) report no 
significant market reaction to goodwill write-offs,3 Hirschey and Richardson (2002, 2003) find a 2-3 
percent negative stock price reaction to goodwill write-off announcements over a two-day window. This 
lack of consistency may be attributable to the differences in the samples of the goodwill write-offs 
examined or to the difficulty in identifying an appropriate research design. By proposing a new research 
design that accounts for the possibility that investors will use available firm performance information to 
form expectations of certain write-offs beforehand, this study documents new and important evidence that 
only unanticipated portions of goodwill write-offs convey unfavorable news to the market, whereas the 
expected portions do not. This study also finds evidence that analysts revise their earnings forecasts 
downward for upcoming quarters in response to an unanticipated IIL, which is similar to the market’s 
response. Overall, given that the test for the goodwill impairment became an annual routine event for 
firms adopting SFAS No. 142, this paper provides timely evidence that unanticipated goodwill 
                                                                                                                                                             
have increased from $(1.11) to $0.31 with the exclusion of goodwill amortization. 
3Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) find that the market reaction to asset write-offs is negative overall, but is 
conditional on the type of asset write-off. They report a negative reaction to inventory write-offs and a positive 
reaction to restructuring charges, but do not find a significant market reaction to goodwill write-offs, although 
goodwill write-offs are the most substantial in their sample, both in terms of dollars per share and as a percentage of 
total assets. 
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impairments are not trivial economic events but rather have important implications for ongoing firm value.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II discusses the institutional background 
to the accounting for goodwill issue and relevant previous studies, section III outlines the research 
hypotheses, and section IV describes the sample selection and data. Section V details the models and 
research methodology that are used to investigate the research questions. Section VI reports the empirical 
results, and section VII concludes with a summary. 
 
II.    Background 
In formulating SFAS No. 142, the FASB has attempted to bring a more realistic approach to goodwill 
accounting. Many had argued that amortizing and expensing a fixed amount of goodwill each year over 
its useful life did not accurately portray the way in which the loss in its economic value occurred, because 
when goodwill loses value it does so irregularly and to varying degrees. The FASB asserts that the new 
approach of a goodwill impairment test combined with the elimination of amortization more accurately 
assesses any actual decline in the value of goodwill and gives greater insight into its economic value. 
Under SFAS No. 142, when assessing whether there has been an impairment of goodwill, firms must 
establish one or more “reporting units” and allocate all their existing goodwill as well as other assets and 
liabilities into these reporting units. In the impairment test, the implied fair value of a reporting unit’s 
goodwill is compared to the carrying amount of the goodwill. If the carrying amount exceeds the implied 
fair value, then the excess must be recognized as an impairment loss. A recognized impairment loss 
cannot be reversed if the fair value of the goodwill subsequently increases. SFAS No. 142 came into effect 
for firms with fiscal years that began after December 15, 2001, and early adoption was available for firms 
with fiscal years that began after March 15, 2001. 
Before the issuance of SFAS No. 142, goodwill impairment was measured in the same way as other 
assets under SFAS No. 121, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived 
Assets To Be Disposed of. Because goodwill is a unique asset that is not directly associated with any 
specific identifiable rights and is not separable from the company as a whole, SFAS No. 142 was 
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formulated to provide specific guidelines for the goodwill impairment test. Under SFAS No. 121, an asset 
is considered to be impaired if the undiscounted future cash flows from the use of the asset are less than 
the carrying value. However, under SFAS No. 142, since the present values of future cash flows is used in 
comparison with the carrying value, goodwill is more likely to be written down than other long-lived 
assets (that is, it is a more conservative measurement of goodwill). Accordingly, the effect of the IIL that 
results from the adoption of SFAS No. 142 on the financial statements of firms was substantial.  The 
FASB states that an IIL charge at the date of the adoption (January 1, 2002 for calendar-year companies) 
is treated as the “cumulative effect of a change in accounting principle.” An advantage of this treatment is 
that the IIL is not charged to operating results, while further future impairments in the subsequent periods 
are charged against operating earnings. 
A stream of literature has documented evidence on the causes and effects of writing-off impaired 
assets. One view of such write-offs is that management uses their discretion to manipulate earnings either 
by ignoring impairment when it occurs or by recognizing it only when it is advantageous to do so (Strong 
and Meyers 1987; Elliott and Shaw 1988). An alternative point of view is that managers record write-offs 
not to manipulate earnings, but primarily to respond appropriately to changes in the economic 
environment of their firms (Rees, Gill and Gore 1996).  Francis et al. (1996) provide evidence that both 
manipulation and economic impairment can drive write-off decisions. My study differs from previous 
studies of write-offs in that the focus is on the effects of adopting the newly mandated accounting rule 
SFAS No. 142, which establishes a different set of standards for testing goodwill impairment. As an IIL in 
the adoption year can be reported as a “cumulative effect of accounting change,” to which analysts and 
investors often assign a lower value weight than income items from continuing operations, the 
discretionary behavior of management and the reaction of stock prices may substantially differ from that 
reported in previous studies.  
Several papers have studied the information content of goodwill amortization. Vincent (1997) 
provides evidence that investors adjust the accounting numbers of pooling and purchase firms to place 
them on an approximately equal basis. By comparing the R2 from annual regressions, Jennings, LeClere, 
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and Thompson (2001) find that earnings before goodwill amortization explain significantly more of the 
distribution of share prices than earnings after goodwill amortization. Lindenberg and Ross (1999) find 
that as goodwill amortization increases, the price-to-earnings multiples increase to a sufficient extent to 
offset the impact of the amortization. Unlike previous studies, this study examines how the elimination of 
goodwill amortization and resultant earnings increase convey information to investors using an event-
study framework. The results of this study will help researchers better understand the informational role 
of goodwill amortization. 
 
III. Hypothesis Development 
Earnings Management Hypotheses 
The adoption of SFAS No. 142 provides an opportunity for earnings management as the standard 
requires substantial judgment and estimation on the part of management, especially in the adoption year. 
This includes, but is not limited to, the identification of reporting units; the allocation of assets, liabilities, 
and goodwill to these units; the fair value measurement of the reporting units; and the measurement of the 
implied fair value of the goodwill.  This flexibility, combined with the potentially large size of the initial 
write-off, suggests that firms may use the adoption of SFAS No. 142 in an opportunistic way. Because 
managers have abilities to manipulate the IIL charge, given the subjectivity of many estimates, their 
preferences and incentives will influence the magnitude of the IIL in a significant and direct way.  
In transitional impairment tests, some firms may understate their IIL and others may overstate it, 
depending on the managerial incentives. I hypothesize two incentives associated with the IIL. The first is 
that as a firm nears its debt covenant constraints, management will be more likely to use accounting 
discretion to understate the IIL, thereby creating a debt covenant slack. Debt covenants, which are written 
mainly in terms of accounting numbers, can be divided into affirmative covenants and negative covenants 
(Bartov 1993). Affirmative covenants require borrowing firms to maintain specified levels of accounting-
based ratios. Negative covenants restrict the financing and investing activities of borrowing firms (for 
example, dividend payments, merger activity, and the issuance of new debt) if any predetermined 
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accounting-based condition in the covenant is not met. As it is costly to violate debt covenants, firms that 
are close to the constraints of their covenants may take actions to manage earnings to reduce the 
likelihood of covenant violation (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Sweeney 1994).  
A large IIL charge will have a negative impact on the financial structure and debt covenant of a firm, 
because it reduces the amount of assets and at the same time it flows through the income statement into 
retained earnings, thus lowering stockholder equity. This impact is reflected in reports in the financial 
press. For example, in a Wall Street Journal article, Bill Cunningham, the director of credit strategy at J. 
P. Morgan Chase & Co., is quoted as saying that he would “absolutely expect some debt covenants to be 
violated as a function of goodwill write-offs.” 4  The article indicates that the potential impact of IIL 
charges on debt covenants is substantial, and implies that management may use its discretion to adjust the 
amount of the IIL to avoid a negative impact on the debt covenant.  
To test this prediction, previous studies often used leverage ratios as a proxy for the existence and 
tightness of accounting-based covenants, largely because of the cost of accessing detailed debt covenant 
information. Following this literature, I adopt leverage (total debt deflated by total assets) as the proxy.5  
Accordingly, I predict that firms with a higher leverage will be more reluctant to accept a large IIL 
charge, as they are more likely to be constrained by debt covenants and to be closer to the violation of the 
constraints of these covenants.  
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the IIL charge will be relatively smaller for more highly leveraged 
firms. 
 
                                                 
4The article also claims that “the looming goodwill write-downs could be large enough to place companies in 
violation of their credit agreements, since the write-downs of goodwill would slash a company’s book value on 
which the covenants are based,” and that “the write-offs could give banks leverage to win concessions from the 
borrowers, such as higher interest rates and fees, the pledging of assets as security or agreements by the companies 
to pay off their loans sooner.” See Rapoport and Weil, “Goodwill as a Banker’s Weapon,” (Wall Street Journal, 
September 23, 2002) for details. 
5The choice of leverage as a proxy has been justified in previous literature. Duke and Hunt (1990) examine the 
relationship between leverage and the existence and tightness of several actual debt covenant restrictions for a 
random sample of firms, and find that leverage captures the existence and tightness of three common restrictions 
that are related to retained earnings, working capital, and net assets. Press and Weintrop (1990) report that for firms 
with accounting constraints in their debt agreements, leverage is correlated with proximity to the actual constraints 
in the debt covenants. In a later section, I perform sensitivity checks on the effect of IIL on debt covenants and 
alternative leverage proxies. 
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A recent change in management may be associated with the magnitude of the IIL charge.  Goodwill 
impairment charges may expose the management of the acquirer to allegations of overpayment for 
acquisitions. Even if such allegations are proved untrue, the management’s reputation may remain tainted 
in the eyes of the capital markets community. Such concerns could make existing management reluctant 
to accept the IIL charge. In contrast, a new management may consciously overstate the IIL charge 
because by attributing the IIL charge to the poor decisions of their predecessors they can reduce the 
possibility of future goodwill impairment, which will be charged against operating earnings after the 
transition period.  
Moore (1973) and DeAngelo (1988) find that new managers have a tendency to “take a bath” by 
writing off assets and increasing the provision for future costs or losses. Strong and Meyer (1987) and 
Francis et al. (1996) also report that asset write-offs are more frequent and larger in magnitude if there 
has been a recent change in management. A common view in earlier research is that a new management 
tends to attempt to blame the previous management for current or past problems. Following this view, I 
predict that a larger IIL charge will be recorded among firms that have undergone a recent change in 
management, because the new managers may deliberately overstate the IIL to reduce the possibility of 
future goodwill write-offs, which will be charged against operating income.6
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the IIL charge will be greater for firms in which there has been a 
recent change in management than for firms in which no such change has occurred. 
 
Stock Market Response Hypotheses 
This section hypothesizes a short-term market reaction to the announcement of a decrease in earnings 
induced by the IIL charge on goodwill and a boost in earnings caused by the elimination of goodwill 
amortization. It is expected that the market will react more strongly to the IIL announcement the more 
unexpected the amount of the IIL. A firm that reports a larger IIL charge than expected, in essence, 
acknowledges that its goodwill asset, and thus the firm itself, will not generate as much cash from its 
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acquisitions as was previously projected. If an unexpected charge signals important changes in a firm’s 
future profit-making potential and the intangible dimension of a firm’s value, then the firm’s stock price 
will be affected because the forecasts that investors make of future cash flows, as foreshadowed by 
unexpected write-offs, will have materially changed.  
The reaction hypothesis is further supported by the fact that an unexpected IIL charge may cause 
some cash flow effects by changing the financial ratios and other measures that are used to monitor 
compliance with various contracts, such as regulatory capital requirements and debt covenants 
(Holthausen 1981; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). For example, if the IIL charge causes a firm to violate 
(or increases its likelihood of violating) the constraints of its debt covenants, then as long as the violation 
is unexpected there will be an adverse impact on the firm’s stock price upon the announcement of the IIL. 
Taking these arguments together, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: A greater (smaller) than expected IIL charge will have a negative (positive) impact on 
a firm’s stock price. 
 
However, it is possible that there will be no reaction to the announcement of the IIL charge. This may 
be the case if goodwill write-offs lack value-relevant information (that is, are mere bookkeeping 
adjustments that have no implications for the firm’s value or cash flow), as some analysts and investment 
banks have argued in the financial press.7  It may also be the case if the market perceives that noise in the 
measurement of an IIL swamps its information content (that is, that the potential manipulation by an 
opportunistic management blurs its value-relevant information content). 
Lastly, I examine the market response to a boost in earnings caused by the elimination of goodwill 
                                                                                                                                                             
6Note that alternative explanations also exist for such a finding. If it is the under performance of the firm that has 
prompted the change in management, then poor performance may be related to the IIL charge. Robustness tests are 
performed in a later section to examine this possible relation. 
7Investment professionals sometimes argue that the accounting impact of goodwill write-offs should be ignored, as 
is illustrated by the following quotes. “We believe that there may be a large catch-up impairment write-off when 
SFAS No. 142 is first adopted; however, it is important to understand that SFAS No. 142 adjustments are non-cash 
and do not reflect changes in business fundamentals” (Equity Research, Saloman Smith Barney, December 28, 
2001). “Wall Street analysts tend to encourage investors to overlook the one-time charge as water under the bridge. 
And fundamentally, even huge goodwill impairment charges by themselves have no impact on the size of a 
company’s cash flow streams or tangible assets” (Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2001). 
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amortization on the dates of earnings announcements. SFAS No. 142 stops goodwill amortization charges, 
and therefore firms that used to recognize a significant amount of goodwill amortization will improve 
their earnings substantially upon adopting the standard. However, investors should not value such 
earnings increases by distinguishing them from other real earnings innovations because such earnings 
increases are cosmetic changes in accounting numbers that do not coincide with changes in potential cash 
flows or risk. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: A firm’s stock price is not significantly associated with a boost in earnings caused by 
the elimination of goodwill amortization. 
 
Note that one could have differing viewpoints. One article comments that the elimination of 
amortization may matter to investors because a rise in earnings leads to a decrease in the price-to-earnings 
ratio, which may make stocks appear cheaper. 8 Nevertheless, the lowered price-to-earnings ratio should 
not be valued if the market makes the necessary adjustments for differences in accounting methods based 
on the analysis of restated pro forma prior earnings, rather than myopically relying on reported earnings.  
The elimination of goodwill amortization may also have potential to reduce the debt-covenant 
violation costs if the covenant is not revised due to re-contracting costs. In such a case, one might expect 
that the stock price reactions will be positive and increasing with leverage. However, the elimination of 
goodwill amortization and the resultant earnings boost are likely to be fully or at least substantially 
anticipated through the previous information events, such as the release of drafts, public hearings, and the 
final announcement of SFAS No. 142.  In turn, it is expected that rational investors consider the potential 
effect on the covenants in advance before the dates of earnings announcements if such effect exists 
 
IV. Data and Sample 
My initial sample consists of firms in the Compustat Industrial database with a goodwill balance of 
greater than 5% of total assets at the end of the 2000 fiscal year (1,772 firms). This requirement is an 
attempt to guarantee that the adoption of SFAS No. 142 has a due influence on the sample firms. To 
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identify a sample of firms that have reported the adoption of SFAS No. 142, the result of a transitional 
impairment test, and earnings announcements following the adoption, I searched the Dow Jones 
Interactive database for the period March 2001 to July 2003.9  The search was conducted using the stock 
ticker symbols of the sample firms and various keywords that are typically observed in such 
announcements, such as “SFAS No. 142,” “goodwill impairment,” and “earnings announcement.” This 
search identified the announcements of 1,319 firms. 
While searching, I found that among the firms with a fiscal year starting between July and December, 
80 firms did not adopt SFAS No. 142 until June 2002. These firms are excluded from the sample, because 
the CRSP data that is necessary for stock market response tests in the adoption year were not available for 
these firms at the point of data collection. For the remaining firms, I retrieved the IIL amount and the 
earnings boost caused by the elimination of goodwill amortization from news releases. I obtained more 
detailed note disclosures about the impairment test, other financial accounting data, and stock price data 
from EdgarScanTM, Compustat, and CRSP, respectively. These procedures excluded 270 firms for which 
relevant data for analyses were not available, which left me with a total of 969 sample firms. Table 1 
reports the details of the sample selection.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Among the 969 final sample firms, 424 (44%) finalized their initial impairment test in the first quarter 
of the adoption year, 446 (46%) finalized it in the second quarter, and 99 firms (10%) had not finished the 
procedure by the end of the second quarter. Among the 870 firms that finalized the procedure, 255 firms 
reported a non-zero IIL charge.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Panel A of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the final sample of 969 firms. The mean 
(median) amount of goodwill in the final sample is about $687.6 ($76.9) million, which represents 20.8% 
                                                                                                                                                             
8Elstein, “Firms Fatten up Profit Outlooks on FASB Rule,” (Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2001). 
9I use this searching period because firms that adopted SFAS No. 142 between March 2001 and December 2002 
(early adopters in 2001 and the others in 2002) were required to complete the first step of the transitional goodwill 
impairment test before their second quarter interim reporting. Dow Jones Interactive includes news releases from 
Business Wire, PR Newswire, Dow Jones Newswire, Southwest Newswire, Reuters, and United Press International.  
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(16.8%) of the book value of the total assets at the beginning of the adoption year. The mean (median) 
goodwill amortization expense in the first quarter of the year before the adoption of SFAS No. 142 is $7.5 
($0.8) million dollars. The mean (median) increase in earnings caused by the elimination of goodwill 
amortization in the first quarter of the adoption year is about 3% (0.7%) of sales revenue. Panel B of 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the IIL of the 255 firms that completed the transitional 
impairment test and reported a non-zero IIL during the first or second quarter following the adoption.  
The mean before-tax (after-tax) IIL is 414.6 (398.5) million dollars. The mean before-tax IIL represents 
8.8% (or 46.3%) of the book value of total assets (or goodwill) at the beginning of the adoption year, and 
the median represents 5.6% (or 38.9%). The amount of the IIL was substantial for the majority of IIL 
recognition firms. While 141 (55.3%) of the 255 IIL recognition firms recorded an IIL of more than 5% 
of the total assets, only 34 (13.3%) recorded an IIL of less than 1% of total assets. 
Panel C of Table 2 shows the industry distribution of the 870 firms that completed the transitional 
impairment test during the first quarter or the second quarter after adoption. The proportion of firms that 
recognized a non-zero IIL is not evenly distributed across industries. The proportions in the 
mining/construction, textiles/publishing, chemicals, durables manufacturers, transportation, and services 
industries are higher than the overall mean proportion (29%). In terms of the magnitude of the IIL 
compared to total assets (goodwill), relatively higher numbers are found in the mining/construction, 
pharmaceuticals, and services industries (mining/construction, chemicals, transportation, retail, and 
computers industries).10 On average, 2.6% (8.9%) of total assets or 13.6% (46.3%) of goodwill were 
written off by all of the sample firms (non-zero IIL sample firms) as a result of IIL recognition in the first 
and second quarter after adoption. 
 
V. Research Design  
Test for Earnings Management  
                                                 
10 I repeat all of the tests in this study after excluding sample firms in the utilities and banking and financial services 
industries, as these firms are subject to heavy government monitoring and regulations, but the inferences stay the 
same. 
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To test the earnings management hypotheses, I estimate the following tobit model.11
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Definition of the variables  
Dependent variable:  
 
• IILi: initial goodwill impairment loss deflated by total assets at the beginning of adoption  
fiscal year for firm i. IILi is measured pre-tax and is expressed as a positive number.         
 
Actual impairment proxy variables: 
 
• Control variables for industry and size  
INDI,i (?): industry dummy variables. 
SIZEi (?): log of total assets at the beginning of adoption fiscal year. 
 
• Control variables for characteristics of goodwill 
GWAi (+): goodwill deflated by total assets at the beginning of adoption fiscal year. 
GWRi (-): excess of the estimated implied fair value of goodwill over the book value of  
                goodwill deflated by total assets. 
IAPDi (+): industry-adjusted amortization period of goodwill before the adoption of  
                SFAS No. 142 (firm i amortization period minus the industry average amortization  
                period). 
IPR&Di (-): in-process R&D costs in M&A over the 5 years before adoption deflated by  
                  total assets. 
 
• Control variables for past asset/stock performance 
RET1i (-): cumulative market-adjusted return over the 1 year before adoption. 
RET4i (-): average annual cumulative market-adjusted return over years -4 to -1  
                 before adoption. 
ROA1i (-): ROAi over the year before adoption.  
ROA4i (-): average annual ROAi over years -4 to -1 before adoption.  
 
Discretionary manipulation proxy variables: 
 
LEVERAGEi (-): total debt deflated by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
iMGMTΔ  (+): 1 if there was a change in key management during the year before  
                   adoption, and 0 otherwise. 
 
The dependent variable IILi is the pre-tax value of the IIL charge for firm i deflated by beginning total 
assets. 12,13 The independent variables consist of two groups: actual impairment proxy variables and two 
                                                 
11 A tobit model is used for the multivariate analysis because the observations on the dependent variables below zero 
are censored (unobservable), but the explanatory variables are available for all of the observations (Maddala 1991). 
12According to U.S. Tax Code Section 197, only goodwill that was acquired after August 10, 1993 in connection 
with a trade or business or in an investing activity is allowed to be amortized (over 15 years) in tax reporting. The 
IIL charge to deductible goodwill does not induce early deductions for tax reporting purposes, but merely creates a 
temporary difference between accounting and taxable income by bringing deferred tax assets and reduced income 
tax expenses into the financial accounting in the adoption year. Measuring the IIL net of tax may introduce 
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discretionary manipulation proxy variables. The actual impairment proxy variables attempt to capture 
cross-sectional variation in the real impairment of goodwill before the attributes of manipulation are 
explored. As Wilson (1996, 172) notes, the credibility of empirical findings in asset write-off studies 
relies on the extent to which the experimental design controls for actual impairment factors. Although 
each actual impairment variable is carefully defined, the hypothesis test will be biased to the extent that 
the missing actual impairment variables have an effect on the manipulation proxies. 
The industry of firms is expected to create some common effects with respect to goodwill 
impairment, as the IIL charge may be closely related to competition, deterioration, or other economic 
factors in an industry.14 SIZEi is a comprehensive variable that proxies for various aspects of a firm. For 
example, it can control for the frequency and amount of previous acquisitions. Large firms generally 
experience a greater number of mergers and acquisitions, and have more complicated structures, and thus 
their goodwill impairment pattern may be different from that of small firms because their operations are 
affected by more frequent acquisitions. It can also proxy for informational efficiency. If there are more 
analysts following large firms and such firms receive greater public attention, then this may lead to the 
more efficient processing of accounting information for these firms and fewer incentives for their 
managers to manipulate the IIL. 
I include four variables to proxy for the characteristics of goodwill. Firms with a greater amount of 
goodwill in their asset composition (firms with a higher GWAi) may incur more goodwill impairment, 
because the relative amount of goodwill that is exposed to the impairment test will be greater. GWRi 
measures the extent to which the estimated implied fair value of firm-wide goodwill exceeds the book 
value of goodwill scaled by total assets, where the implied fair value of goodwill is estimated as follows. 
                                                                                                                                                             
unnecessary noise in the association of goodwill impairment with the independent variables, because it may be 
significantly different from the actual amount of goodwill write-off, depending on the deductibility of goodwill. 
Hence, I use the before-tax IIL for all of the analyses in this study. However, when both earnings management and 
stock market response tests are performed with the IIL net of tax, the main results are qualitatively the same. 
13As the impact of an IIL on earnings is partly offset by the elimination of goodwill amortization, I also attempt an 
alternative measure of IIL net of the reduction in goodwill amortization, and find that the results with this alternative 
dependent variable are qualitatively similar. 
14Industry classification is described under Panel C of Table 2. 
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Implied fair value of goodwill of a firm  
     = Fair (market) value of the firm - Fair value of the net identifiable assets of the firm   
    ≈  Market Capitalization  –  (Net book value of the firm – Goodwill amount). 
This measure of the implied fair value of goodwill assumes that the whole firm was purchased in a 
business combination in which the fair value of identifiable assets and liabilities was assumed to be equal 
to their book values.15  I expect a firm with a higher GWR to be likely to incur a smaller goodwill 
impairment.  
IAPDi measures the industry-adjusted amortization period of goodwill before the adoption of SFAS 
No. 142 (the firm i amortization period - the industry average amortization period in the sample firms).16  
Before SFAS No. 142, the SEC increasingly recommended that the amortization period of goodwill be 
related to the nature of the business that was acquired. Accordingly, high-tech acquisitions often used 5 to 
7 year amortization periods and banks used 15 to 20 year periods. Occasionally, other firms set a longer 
amortization period to reduce the effect of goodwill amortization on earnings, which caused a high 
variation in the amortization period within an industry. I predict that a firm with a longer amortization 
period than the industry average will incur a greater IIL, because its amortization expense in the past is 
more likely to have been understated compared to the reduction in the economic value of its goodwill. 
IPR&Di measures the in-process R&D costs of acquisitions over the 5 years before the adoption of 
SFAS No. 142. Some firms write off a large portion of their acquisition costs as purchased R&D upon 
acquisition, and there has been an increase in such write-offs during the last decade, especially in the 
high-tech industries. This practice allows the acquiring firms to reduce the allocation of goodwill and the 
subsequent amortization expense. The in-process R&D write-off is predicted to improve the quality of the 
goodwill of the acquiring firms (Deng and Lev 2001), and a firm that recognized a greater amount of 
these write-offs in the past is expected to incur a smaller IIL. 
                                                 
15Although GWR is a direct measure of the IIL of firms, but it is noisy because of the assumptions that are involved. 
Because of this, other actual impairment proxies are included in the regression.  
16The industry average amortization period is calculated for each INDI category. The data of the amortization 
periods are obtained from the note disclosures on the goodwill accounting policy of the sample firms. 
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The next set of variables controls for historical stock or asset performance. Like Francis et al. (1996), 
I control for long-term historical performance (years -4 to –1 before adoption) and recent performance 
(year -1 to 0), because impairment may start to occur long before adoption.17  RET1i and RET4i are 
included because the IIL is likely to be closely related to past stock price performance. In determining the 
fair value of a reporting unit, firms first look for the market price of the unit in active markets, and so the 
worse a firm’s historical stock performance, the more likely its goodwill will be impaired.  ROA1i and 
ROA4i capture the returns on assets (ROA).18 Firms with a higher ROA are likely to incur a smaller IIL 
because the fair value of their assets will be more appreciated.    
Finally, two proxies of earnings management incentives are included. LEVERAGEi is the total debt 
deflated by total assets at the beginning of the adoption year.19 This is included to test H1. is a 
dummy variable to test H2, and has a value of 1 if any of the top three compensated positions changed 
over the year before adoption, and 0 otherwise.
iMGMTΔ
20   
 
Test of Stock Market Response 
This section outlines the examination of the market reaction to the announcement of the IIL charge 
and the earnings boost caused by the elimination of goodwill amortization.  In searching Dow Jones 
Interactive, I found that the IIL charge was disclosed in conjunction with the earnings disclosure for all 
but one of the sample firms. Thus, the announcement period return is defined as the cumulative return 
from one day before to one day after the earnings announcement of the first or second quarter in the 
adoption fiscal year less the return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio.  The inclusion of day-1 
is meant to capture early news leakage, whereas the inclusion of day+1 ensures that the price impact of 
                                                 
17Starting with the 4 years before adoption is a judgment that is based on the study of Ayers, Lefanowicz and 
Robinson (2000). Using the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) M&A Database, they show that firm acquisitions 
by purchase method became more frequent in number and more significant in acquisition amounts from 1998. 
18ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation (Compustat #13) divided by average total assets (#6). 
19Total debt is defined as the sum of long-term debt (Compustat #9) and debt in current liabilities (#34). In a later 
section, a check for the sensitivity of the results relative to this particular definition of leverage is performed. As the 
results are indistinguishable, I only report the results using this definition. 
20Data on changes in management were obtained from each firm’s proxy statement. 
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any announcements after the market closed is captured.21   
The announcement period returns (CAR) reflect the market’s contemporaneous reaction to the news 
of earnings in the quarter, and so I regress this on the earnings surprise (SURPRISE). For the firms (700 
firms) for which analyst forecasts are available in IBES, the earnings surprise is defined as the actual pro 
forma IBES earnings per share minus the most recent mean IBES earnings per share forecast before the 
earnings announcement scaled by the share price on day-2.22  For the firms (269 firms) for which IBES 
data are not available, it is defined as the change in quarterly earnings per share excluding the IIL and 
goodwill amortization (seasonal random walk: current quarter minus the same quarter of the preceding 
year) scaled by the share price on day-2. 
In addition, four previously documented determinants of stock returns are included: the book-to-
market ratio (BTM), which is constructed as the book value of shareholders’ equity divided by the market 
value of equity at the end of the fiscal quarter; the size (SIZE) of the firm as measured by the log of the 
market value of the equity at the end of the fiscal quarter; beta (BETA), which is estimated using the daily 
returns over the year before the fiscal quarter; and momentum (MOM), which is calculated as the market-
adjusted stock return for the six months before the earnings announcement. The first three control 
variables are frequently used as risk factors, whereas the last is often used to control for the so-called 
momentum anomaly (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). Finally, I include in the regression information on the 
IIL charges and the boost in earnings that is due to the elimination of goodwill amortization. This results 
in the following two-quarter-pooled regression. 
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After controlling for other contemporaneous information, this model tests the stock price reaction to 
                                                 
21As a sensitivity test, the announcement period returns are also measured using a 2-day window (0 to1), and the 
overall result is consistent.  
22IBES EPS measures do not include the items below income from continuing operations, such as discontinued 
operations, extraordinary items, and the cumulative effect of accounting changes (which incorporates the IIL 
charge). IBES has migrated its estimates from using a pre-SFAS No. 142 basis that included goodwill amortization 
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the information of the IIL per share (partitioned into expected (EIIL) and unexpected (UIIL) components) 
and the boost in earnings (AMORT) per share that is due to the elimination of goodwill amortization, both 
scaled by the share price on day-2. If the finalized IIL is announced in the first (second) post-adoption 
earnings announcement for a firm, then DIIL = 1 for the first (second) earnings announcement period 
observation and DIIL = 0 for the second (first) earnings announcement period observation for the firm. 
Although researchers often use the consensus analyst earnings forecast as the proxy for expected 
earnings, it is not straightforward to find a reasonable benchmark for the market’s expectation of the IIL. 
Due to this difficulty, most previous studies of asset write-offs (for example, Francis et al. 1996; Elliott 
and Hanna 1996; Elliott and Shaw 1988) use the entire amount of the write-off as the independent 
variable, rather than estimating the unexpected portion, and assume all write-offs to be purely 
unanticipated. However, as is discussed in the next section, firms that announced a non-zero IIL 
experienced deteriorating accounting or stock performance relative to firms that announced a zero IIL 
before the adoption of SFAS No. 142. Therefore, it is unlikely that all of the charge was a complete 
surprise to the market. To the extent that the market partially anticipates the IIL before its announcement, 
using the entire IIL amount introduces a measurement error and inconsistent estimates of the market 
response. I therefore estimate two pairs of the expected and unexpected IIL by using Eq. (1). 
(1) EIIL1i = E[IILi] using only the actual impairment proxy variables in Eq. (1), UIIL1i = ei. 
(2) EIIL2i = E[IILi] using both the actual impairment and the discretionary manipulation proxy  
                    variables in Eq. (1), UIIL2i = ei. 
 
The first pair of estimates assumes that investors formulate their expectations of the IIL based on the 
firm’s industry, size, past stock or operating performance, and firm-specific indicators of goodwill quality 
as with the actual impairment proxies in Eq. (1), and that investors are unable to see through the earnings 
management incentives. The second pair assumes that investors take into account the discretionary 
                                                                                                                                                             
to a post-SFAS No. 142 basis that excludes goodwill amortization. IBES has announced that once a firm reports its 
results as having been affected by SFAS No. 142, the old basis estimates are automatically moved to a backup table.  
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manipulation incentives in formulating their expectation of the IIL.23  The appropriateness of these two 
pairs of estimates depends on how closely the proxy variables in Eq. (1) approximate the unobservable 
perception of investors of impaired goodwill. However, the power of my tests will be reduced to the 
extent that investors rely on non-accounting and non-stock-market information or other management 
incentives that are not reflected in Eq. (1). If the test results reveal a significant negative coefficient on 
UIILi and an insignificant coefficient on EIILi, then this will be consistent with H3. An insignificant 
coefficient on AMORTi would be consistent with H4. 
 
 
 
VI. Empirical Results 
Test of Earnings Management 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables that are used in the earnings management test.  
The table presents the mean and median values of the variables for the IIL firms (N = 255), zero-IIL firms 
(N = 615), and all of the sample firms (N = 870) that announced the finalized IIL measurement in the first 
or second quarter after adoption. The two rightmost columns report the mean and median differences 
between the IIL firms and the zero-IIL firms using a binomial t-test and a nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, respectively.   
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Overall, the IIL firms exhibit significantly lower RET1, RET4, and ROA1 than the zero-IIL firms. 
This suggests that the historical asset or stock performance of the IIL firms is inferior to that of the zero-
IIL firms before adoption. In general, the IIL firms are significantly larger in size and carry a higher 
percentage of goodwill relative to total assets than the zero-IIL firms. A higher mean GWR among the 
zero-IIL firms indicates that the implied fair value of goodwill exceeds the book value of goodwill to a 
greater extent among the zero-IIL firms (and thus gives them a greater buffer against the IIL charge) than 
                                                 
23EIIL and UIIL are deflated by total assets when estimated by Eq. (1). I convert them to per-share amounts by 
multiplying the total assets and dividing them by the weighted average (basic) number of shares outstanding for the 
quarter, scaled by the share price on day-2. For the list of actual impairment proxy variables and discretionary 
manipulation proxy variables, please refer to the definition of the variables in the section V. 
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among the IIL firms. In addition, the IIL firms have a significantly higher mean management turnover 
( ) than the zero-IIL firms in the year before adoption. Of the IIL firms, 23.5% experienced 
changes in the three best compensated positions in the year before adoption, whereas only 12.5% of the 
zero-IIL firms experienced such changes. In addition, the IIL firms are significantly more highly 
leveraged than the zero-IIL firms. 
MGMTΔ
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Model 1 in Table 4 provides the results for the multivariate tobit analysis (Eq. (1)). With the 
exception of IND, IPR&D, and ROA4, the actual impairment variables significantly explain the IIL.  
Consistent with the predictions, the coefficient on GWA (GWR) is significantly positive (negative). The 
historical performance variables of RET1, RET4, and ROA1 have significant negative coefficients as 
predicted. Although it has the predicted negative sign, IPR&D is insignificant. The coefficient on SIZE is 
significantly positive. IAPD (firm goodwill amortization period minus the industry average amortization 
period in the sample firms) is significant, but takes a negative sign, contrary to the positive sign that was 
predicted. There would be two possible explanations for the unexpected sign. First, the industry 
classification might not be precise enough to capture the industry-specific goodwill deterioration pattern. 
Second, if a firm’s amortization period is longer than the industry average, then this may indicate that the 
firm correctly perceives that the period of benefit that it derives from its goodwill is longer than that of 
other firms in the same industry.  
Both of the earnings management incentive variables have the predicted signs. As hypothesized, the 
amount of the IIL is significantly greater for firms that experienced a management change than for firms 
that did not experience such a change, and significantly decreases with a firm’s level of debt.  This result 
suggests that new managers may overstate the IIL charge, and that managers may understate the charge as 
the likelihood of debt covenant violation increases. This finding supports the contention that the IIL is 
used to manage earnings. 
Robustness Tests for Earnings Management Incentive 
I first perform two sensitivity checks of the result that supports H1. The first examines whether the 
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result exists only for firms with a debt covenant that includes the cumulative effect of accounting changes 
and specifies a minimum level of retained earnings or net assets, and the second examines whether the 
result is robust to different proxies for debt covenant constraints.   
Although I use leverage as a rough proxy for the debt covenant tightness of a large sample, it is 
possible that some debt covenants are immune to the IIL if the covenants exclude the effect of accounting 
changes or below-the-line special items. To address this possibility, I further examine the details of 
covenants by searching the debt contracts of the sample firms that were attached as material exhibits to 
their financial statements in the year before SFAS No. 142 was adopted. Due to missing information for 
some firms, I obtain only debt contract information for 169 of the 870 sample firms. Among those 169 
firms, I find that 96 (or 57%) have covenant restrictions on retained earnings or net assets.24 Among these 
96 firms, 38 (or 40%) explicitly exclude the effects of accounting changes or special items in their 
covenant calculations. That is, of the sub-sample of 169 firms for which covenant information is 
available, 58 (34%) have a covenant that is likely to be affected by an IIL through the effect on retained 
earnings or net assets. I set a dummy variable, D_Restrict, that equals 1 if a firm is one of these 58 firms 
and 0 otherwise, and re-estimate Eq. (1) with the sub-sample of 169 firms after adding an interaction 
variable between LEVERAGE and D_Restrict. The result, which is provided in Model 2 of Table 4, 
indicates that although most of the results are similar to those reported in Model 1, the coefficient on 
LEVERAGE*D_Restrict is significant and negative. This suggests that highly leveraged firms are less 
likely to record an IIL when their covenants include the effect of accounting changes and restrictions on 
retained earnings and net assets than when their covenants exclude accounting changes or do not have 
such restrictions. Interestingly, the coefficient on LEVERAGE is still negative and significant, which 
suggests that highly leveraged firms are reluctant to record an IIL, even when their covenants are not 
likely to be tightened as a result.  
For the second sensitivity check for H1, I use three other measures of LEVERAGE to proxy for the 
                                                 
24 The other covenants have restrictions only on other dimensions of the financial statement, such as working capital, 
the sale or disposal of assets, and investments, none of which are directly linked to IIL. 
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existence and tightness of debt covenants: long-term debt over stockholder equity, long-term debt over 
market value of equity, and total debt over stockholder equity at the beginning of the adoption year. 
Because these three alternative proxies are often used in previous studies, I examine whether my finding 
is sensitive to the choice of the LEVERAGE proxy.25  However, I find that the use of these alternative 
proxies does not change my predictions. An untabulated result indicates that the empirical results with the 
alternative proxies are similar to those that are reported in Models 1 and 2.  
For H2, I further examine whether the association between the IIL and MGMTΔ is driven by cases in 
which poor firm performance prompted a change in management. If a management change was prompted 
by poor firm performance, then the portion of the IIL that is associated with MGMTΔ may not be 
attributable to earnings management. To address this issue, I perform robustness tests by partitioning the 
sample firms in the two ways, first based on actual firm performance before adoption and second 
according to whether the departure of a key manager was voluntary or involuntary (forced).   
For the first partitioning, I construct a composite performance measure that I obtain from a principal 
component analysis with the four variables in Eq. (1), that is, RET1, RET2, ROA1, and ROA4. The result 
of the principal component analysis indicates that the first two components capture most of the variance 
in the four variables (71.6%) and have associated eigenvalues of larger than 1. Thus, I use the first two 
principal components to construct the composite measure.  All of the sample firms are then divided into 
three groups based on their scores for the composite measure: “high performers,” “medium performers,” 
and “low performers.” 26  The multivariate tobit analysis (Eq. (1)) is repeated for each group. If the IIL 
charge associated with is mainly driven by poor past performance, then it is expected that the 
association will be more significant and greater for the low performers and less significant or insignificant 
for the high performers. Contrary to this expectation, untabulated results show that the coefficient on 
for the high performers is insignificantly different from that for the low performers. However, 
MGMTΔ
MGMTΔ
                                                 
25 See Duke and Hunt (1990) and Press and Weintrop (1990) for a summary of these studies. 
26In each group (total firms, firms that underwent a management change, and firms with a non-zero IIL) the numbers 
are as follows: high performers (290, 35, 54), medium performers (290, 44, 95), and low performers (290, 58, 106). 
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both coefficients are significantly greater than zero, which implies that the higher IIL among the firms 
that underwent a management change is at least partly driven by the discretionary behavior of the 
incoming managers to reduce the possibility of future goodwill impairment.  
The second method of partitioning is based on whether a management departure was voluntary or 
involuntary (forced). If a management change is classified as involuntary or forced, then the previous 
managers are more likely to have been terminated because of poor performance. I searched newswires, 
business press, and proxy statements to find reasons for each manager’s departure. I place the cases of 
management changes into the voluntary departure category if the manager left voluntarily for a similar 
position at another firm, if the manager was aged 64 or older, or when a proxy statement explicitly states 
that the reason for the departure was the manager’s retirement or death, all of which are criteria that are 
based on previous studies (Murphy and Zimmerman 1993, Berger, Ofek and Yermack 1997).27 All of the 
other cases are classified as involuntary departures.  
As a result of this classification, of the 137 sample firms that experienced a change in management, 
103 (75%) are classified in the involuntary category and 34 firms (25%) in the voluntary category. I set a 
dummy variable, Involuntary, that equals 1 if a firm is classified as having experienced an involuntary 
management departure and 0 otherwise, and re-estimate Eq. (1) after adding a two-way interaction 
dummy variable between and Involuntary. The result, which is shown in Model 3 of Table 4, 
indicates that the sign and magnitude of the coefficient on each actual impairment proxy variable closely 
mimic those reported in Model 1. Although the coefficients on LEVERAGE and 
MGMTΔ
MGMTΔ are significant 
with the same sign in the previous result, the interaction dummy variable between and 
Involuntary is not statistically significant. This indicates that regardless of whether a manager leaves the 
firm voluntarily or involuntarily, the IIL charge is greater by the same magnitude for firms that underwent 
a recent change in management relative to firms in which no such change occurred.   
MGMTΔ
                                                 
27Other studies show that many firms have an explicit policy of retirement at 64 or 65 for executives. Gibbons and 
Murphy (1992) report survey evidence that indicates that 59 of the 113 surveyed firms had a policy of retirement at 
65 for executives. Dechow and Sloan (1991) use CEO age at turnover as a proxy for normal retirement. As most 
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In sum, the result that incoming managers tend to overstate the IIL is invariant to whether the sample 
is partitioned based on firm performance or on whether a recent management departure was voluntary or 
involuntary departure. There is little evidence that the poor past performance of firms that have 
experienced a recent management change mainly determines the association between the IIL 
and . MGMTΔ
Test of Stock Market Response 
As can be seen in Table 1, of the 969 sample firms, 424 reported their results of finalized IIL in the 
first quarter earnings announcement (DIIL = 1 in the first quarter and 0 in the second quarter in Eq. (2)), 
446 reported in the second quarter earnings announcement (DIIL = 0 in the first quarter and 1 in the 
second quarter), and 99 firms had not finalized the test by the end of the second quarter (DIIL = 0 for both 
first and second quarters). Of the 969 sample firms, I delete all of the observations with a share price of 
below 0.5 dollars in the event period to avoid extreme return observations. In addition, to mitigate the 
impact of possible outliers in the estimation of Eq. (2), I winsorize the extreme values of all of the 
variables (smaller than 1% or greater than 99% of the value of each variable) to this limiting value.28  I 
then perform a two-quarter-pooled stock market reaction test using 1,764 observations.   
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the variables that are used in the test. The median 3-day (-1 
to +1) market-adjusted return over the event period is slightly positive (.0051), which reflects the positive 
median earnings surprise (.0005). The median increase in quarterly earnings per share that is caused by 
the elimination of goodwill amortization, deflated by the share price, is .0023. Among the 799 firms for 
which the IIL test results are available for the stock reaction tests, the predicted IIL (EIIL1) for 698 of 
them (87.4%) is negative when only the actual impairment proxies in Eq. (1) are used to predict the IIL. 
                                                                                                                                                             
proxy statements do not provide information about the reason for a management change, I assume that departures 
among those aged 64 or older are more likely due to voluntary retirement, in accordance with previous studies. 
28I perform sensitivity tests, deleting all of the observations with a share price below 0.2 dollars and below 1 dollar 
in the event period. The overall results are consistent with those that are presented here. I also perform all of the 
empirical analyses without winsorizing, and by removing outliers when the absolute value of the residual is at least 
four times greater than its standard error. The results are qualitatively similar. 
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When both the actual impairment and manipulation proxies are used, the predicted IIL (EIIL2) in 694 of 
the firms (86.9%) is negative. Before performing further analyses, I slightly modified EIIL and UIIL so 
that the variables can have realistic values. Specifically, when the predicted IIL is negative (that is, when 
no impairment is predicted), I set EIIL = UIIL = 0 for firms for which the announced IIL is zero, and set 
EIIL = 0 and UIIL =  IIL for firms for which the announced IIL is greater than zero. When the predicted 
IIL is positive (that is, when some impairment is predicted), I define EIIL = predicted IIL and UIIL = (IIL 
– predicted IIL) < IIL, respectively.29 Note that the sum of EIIL and UIIL is equal to IIL in any instance. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of a multivariate regression analysis of the event period returns 
(Eq. (2)). Model 1 in Panel A assumes that all of the IIL charge is unanticipated by the market, whereas 
Model 2 (Model 3) assumes that the market formulates an expectation of the IIL using only the actual 
impairment proxies (using both the actual and manipulation proxies) in Eq. (1). In all three of the models, 
the market-adjusted announcement period return is positively associated with the earnings surprise, which 
indicates that the market rewards a positive earnings surprise. Beta is negatively associated with the 
returns. Consistent with previous studies, the book-to-market ratio and the price momentum are positively 
related to the event period returns, and size is negatively associated with the returns, although not 
significantly.   
When I examine the relation between the event period returns and the two variables of interest, that is,  
AMORT and IIL, in all three models, the earnings boost that is due to the elimination of goodwill 
amortization is not significantly associated with the market-adjusted announcement period return. This 
result suggests that the market anticipates and adjusts for differences in accounting method once firms 
indicate that they have been affected by SFAS No. 142, and thus the market does not value the cosmetic 
accounting earnings boost. An alternative explanation would be that the goodwill amortization in the pre- 
                                                 
29The IIL expectation model, Eq. (1), substantially explains the magnitude of IIL (Pseudo R2 = 58.3%), but the 
predicted sign of IIL is inconsistent with the sign of the actual IIL (no impairment vs. impairment) for 189 firms or 
24% (185 firms or 23%) among the 799 sample firms for stock return tests when the predicted IIL is EIIL1 (EIIL2). 
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SFAS No. 142 period may be essentially value-irrelevant noise and makes virtually no contribution to 
explaining stock returns.30  Second, the results show that the return is significantly negatively associated 
with the IIL in general (Model 1), which suggests that the announcement of the IIL conveys some value-
relevant information to the market.  However, when the IIL is partitioned into two parts (EIIL and UIIL), 
the association with the UIIL is much greater and more significant (Models 2 and 3). The return is 
insignificantly associated with the portion of the IIL that is anticipated by Eq. (1). However, the market 
responds more negatively and more significantly to the portion of the IIL that is unanticipated, as is 
reflected in the coefficients on UIIL.31
In Panel A of Table 6, I pool the first and the second quarter IIL charge in Eq. (2), on the assumption 
that no IIL information leakage occurs before the finalized IIL announcement. However, some of the 
firms that had not finalized the IIL test procedure until the first quarter’s earnings announcement provided 
some information about their expectation of the upcoming IIL test results in their first quarter 10-Q notes. 
Panel B of Table 6 summarizes the nature of the information that was disclosed by 545 of the firms that 
had not finished the IIL test procedure by the first quarter. The information in the first quarter that those 
firms provided is consistent, in general, with the actual IIL test results in the second quarter.  Among the 
firms that declared “Expect no IIL” (N = 36) or “Will be no material IIL” (N = 38) in the first quarter, 
only 3 recorded a small amount of actual IIL in the second quarter. Among the firms that announced 
“Will be some IIL” (N = 26) or “Will be substantial IIL” (N = 25) in the first quarter, none showed a zero 
IIL in the second quarter.  
                                                                                                                                                             
There are 35 (33) firms with actual IIL = 0 and predicted IIL>0, and 154 (152) firms with actual IIL>0 and predicted 
IIL<0. 
30To further gain insight into whether the insignificant association is due to the market’s full anticipation and 
adjustment or the lack of information content of goodwill amortization, I re-examined the Eq. (2) after I replaced 
AMORT by a simple unexpected earnings boost measure, which is the difference between actual earnings 
improvement by discontinuity of amortization (as reported in pro forma statements) and quarterly goodwill 
amortization expense in the prior year (estimated by the prior year annual goodwill amortization expense divided by 
four). The results still show insignificant associations in all models, which is more consistent with the latter 
explanation. However, possible estimation errors in the unexpected earnings boost will limit this conclusion. 
31I examine whether the association between the return and the IIL (or EIIL and UIIL) varies according to whether 
the firm experienced a management change or not, given a possibility that the market may perceive the goodwill 
impairment of firms that experienced a management change to be more discretionary or more related to the remedial 
actions of the new management. Although not tabulated, I find that the association is similar for the two groups. 
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To ensure that test results are not affected by the information that was released early by those firms, I 
repeat the analysis of the event period return but set DIIL = 0 for the second quarter observations in which 
the nature of the IIL test information was disclosed in the first quarter. As can be seen in Panel C of Table 
6, the overall results stay the same. The market negatively reacts to the IIL charge and reacts more 
significantly to an unanticipated IIL. 
Taken together, the results of the stock market tests are consistent with the hypotheses. While the 
insignificant association with the exclusion of goodwill amortization suggests the market’s anticipation of 
such a boost in earnings or the lack of information content of goodwill amortization,  the market appears 
to consider that unanticipated goodwill write-offs contain information about important changes in the 
value of the firm. In the next two sections, the association of the return and the IIL is further analyzed to 
examine what information content about the IIL charge is conveyed upon the announcement of the IIL.32
Leverage and Stock Market Response 
As has been discussed, although the IIL charge is a non-cash charge, it may induce some cash flow 
effects through changes in the financial ratios that are used to monitor compliance with various contracts.  
If an unexpected IIL charge causes a violation (or increases the likelihood of violation) of a debt 
covenant, then this may negatively affect a firm’s future investing and financing decisions. To the extent 
that the new set of investment and financing decisions adversely affects firm value, the IIL charge may 
cause a change in the value of a firm upon its announcement. 
I anticipate that the impact of an unexpected IIL charge will be greater for highly leveraged firms that 
are closer to their borrowing constraints, because their new investment and financing decisions are more 
likely to be affected by the IIL charge. To explore this possible relation, I rank all of the observations 
based on firm leverage at the beginning of the fiscal year in which adoption took place and form three 
leverage groups (low, mid, and high leverage firms). I re-estimate the Eq. (2) for each group. The result is 
                                                 
32When I repeat the tests of stock market response using the IIL net of tax, the main results do not change. For 
example, the coefficient on IIL is -0.0321 (p-value = 0.03) in Model 1 of Panel C in Table 6, the coefficient on 
EIIL1 (EIIL2) is -0.0247 with a p-value = 0.63(-0.0275 with a p-value = 0.30), and the coefficient on UIIL1 (UIIL2) 
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tabulated in Table 7 using EIIL1 and UIIL1 as measures of the expected and unexpected IIL charges.33  
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
The coefficients on AMORT and EIIL1 are not significant at the .10 level in any of the leverage 
groups, which is consistent with previous results. However, the coefficient on UIIL1 is not significant for 
the low leverage firms, and the coefficient for the high leverage firms is more negative and more 
significant than it is for the mid-leverage firms. To further test whether the coefficient on UIIL1 for the 
high leverage firms is significantly different from those for the other two leverage groups, I perform a 
pooled sample analysis using all the leverage groups after I include a dummy variable D_HL and the 
interaction variable of D_HL*UIIL1 in the model, whereas I define the D_HL as one for high leverage 
firms and zero otherwise. An untabulated result indicates that the coefficients on D_HL, UIIL1, and 
D_HL*UIIL1 are -0.0016 (t-value= -0.27), -0.0298 (t-value= -2.31), and -0.0135 (t-value= -2.28), 
respectively. The coefficient on the interaction variable D_HL*UIIL1 suggests that the difference in the 
UIIL1 coefficients between the high leverage group and the other groups is significant.  
In sum, the results show that the negative market response to an unexpected IIL charge is stronger for 
high leverage firms than for low leverage firms. I interpret this as the result of an unexpected IIL charge 
having an adverse impact on the debt contracts of firms, especially firms with a relatively poor financial 
structure. As more highly leveraged firms are closer to the constraints of their debt covenants and their 
new financing and investing activities are more likely to have been affected by the amount of the IIL, the 
market appears to penalize these firms more heavily when they disclose an IIL.  
Analyst Forecast Revisions 
To assess whether the negative stock price reaction that is associated with the IIL announcement is, at 
least in part, attributable to the important information about deterioration in a firm’s future earning 
potential that the IIL charge conveys, this section compares the mean analyst earnings forecasts before 
and after the IIL announcement. Specifically, I examine the adjustments that analysts make to their 
                                                                                                                                                             
is -0.0520 with a p-value <0.01 (-0.0498 with a p-value <0.01) in Model 2 (3) of Panel C in Table 6, which is 
consistent with H3. The results of Tables 7 and 8 are also qualitatively similar to the previous results. 
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forecasts of the earnings in the three quarters after the IIL announcement. This comparison provides 
insight into whether analysts believe that the IIL charge conveys information on the future profitability of 
firms. A finding that analysts adjust their forecasts downward would be consistent with the IIL charge 
signaling the deterioration of future operations. The examination of the reaction of analysts to the 
announcement of the IIL charge has several advantages over the examination of the market response. 
First, by using analyst forecast data, I can obtain a clear measure of future earnings expectations before 
and after the announcement. Second, because analysts provide earnings forecasts over various future 
intervals, I am able to look into their revisions of earnings forecasts for various future intervals separately. 
To examine the relation between forecast revisions and the IIL, I estimate the following regressions 
for the sub-sample of firms with available forecasts (from IBES) over the three time horizons in the 
month before and the month after the IIL announcement.  
 
iii
k
i IILSURPRISEAFREV εββα +++= 21                                                                            (3) 
iiii
k
i UIILEIILSURPRISEAFREV εβββα ++++= 321 ,                                                          (4) 
 where  
k
iAFREV = Analyst revision of the k quarter ahead (k = 1, 2, or 3) EPS forecast around the IIL 
announcement. This is computed as the mean forecast in the month after the IIL announcement minus 
the mean forecast in the month before the announcement deflated by the share price at the end of the 
fiscal quarter. 
 
In the model, the analyst forecast revisions are regressed on the amount of the IIL charge and the 
concurrent earnings surprise. Earnings surprise is included in the regression to control for any revision 
that is attributable to the contemporaneous earnings announcement. If analysts perceive that the earnings 
surprise will persist into the upcoming quarters, then a positive coefficient on SURPRISE is predicted. A 
finding of a negative coefficient on IIL (UIIL) would be consistent with the (unexpected) IIL charge 
providing a signal to analysts of deteriorating profitability in the upcoming quarters. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                                                                                                                             
33The test results using EIIL2 and UIIL2 are qualitatively similar to the results that are reported in Table 7. 
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Table 8 provides the results of the estimation of regression Eqs (3) and (4) for the revisions forecasts 
over the three different time horizons. In all of the regressions, the coefficients on earnings surprise are 
positive and significant, as expected. The coefficient on IIL in Eq. (3) is negative and significant for all of 
the time horizons. However, when the IIL is partitioned into EIIL1 and UIIL1 in Eq. (4), only the 
coefficient on UIIL1 is negative and significant. This suggests that analysts believe that the IIL charge 
conveys incremental information about a decline in earnings in the upcoming quarters relative to previous 
forecasts, but that they revise their forecasts downward only in response to the portion of the IIL that is 
unanticipated. There is thus a possibility that the analysts had some expectation of the IIL before its 
announcement, and incorporated this expectation in their previous forecasts. Overall, the evidence that is 
presented here is at least partly consistent with the unexpected IIL charge signaling the declining future 
profitability of firms to analysts, which confirms that an unexpected IIL conveys incremental information 
about poor earnings in the future. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
This study examines the discretionary behavior of management and stock price reaction with respect 
to the adoption of SFAS No. 142. I find that the proxies for actual goodwill impairment are significant in 
explaining the magnitude of the IIL charge. After controlling for these proxies, I show that the IIL charge 
is greater in magnitude when there has been a recent change in management, and that the charge is 
smaller for more highly leveraged firms. These results help to understand the incentives of managers in 
determining the amount of the goodwill impairment.  
An examination of the stock return in the event period reveals no significant association with an 
expected IIL and the elimination of amortization. However, the return is negatively related to an 
unanticipated IIL, with the negative relation being stronger for more highly leveraged firms. Further 
analysis shows that analysts revise their earnings forecasts downward for upcoming quarters in response 
to an unanticipated IIL. These results are interpreted as evidence that an unexpected IIL charge conveys 
value-relevant information such as a negative view of future operations or adverse effects on a firm’s debt 
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contracts.  
Overall, in terms of its informational role, SFAS No. 142 appears to have made some improvement to 
goodwill accounting. The negative market reaction to the IIL indicates the communication of value-
relevant goodwill information from management to investors. The value of goodwill accounting lies in its 
timely provision of relevant and reliable information for investors and accounting users.  The value of this 
information and its impact, however, will be tempered by the extent to which management takes 
advantage of the flexibility afforded by SFAS No. 142 to opportunistically manage the goodwill 
impairment.  
I leave to future research the examination of the long-term effects of the adoption of SFAS No. 142. 
Although the results in this study provide interesting early evidence of the immediate effect of the 
adoption, the long-term effects are unknown. It would be interesting to compare the association between 
earnings and returns and between the book value and market value of equity in the pre- and post- SFAS 
No. 142 periods (so-called alignment studies). Further alignment tests would offer an opportunity to 
explore additional questions that are related to the relevance of writing off goodwill. 
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Table 1 
Sample Construction 
 
 
  
Firms with a goodwill balance of greater than 5% of total assets at the end of 
the 2000 fiscal year in Compustat. 
1,772  
  
(-) Firms for which the announcement of SFAS No. 142 adoption or 
the earnings announcements of the first two quarters in the adoption 
year are unidentifiable in Dow Jones Interactive. 
(453) 
  
(-) Firms that did not adopt SFAS No. 142 until June 2002. 
 
(80) 
  
Total number of firms for which SFAS No. 142 data are hand collected. 1,239  
  
(-) Firms for which other relevant financial accounting data in 
Compustat or note disclosures in EdgarscanTM are insufficient for 
analysis. 
 
(96) 
(-) Firms for which CRSP stock return data are not available. (174) 
  
Final sample 969  
  
  
Initial impairment loss (IIL) disclosure 
 
  
                                           1st quarter of the adoption year   
  
IIL occurred 150  
IIL = 0 274  
                                                              424  
                                           2nd quarter of the adoption year   
  
IIL occurred 105  
IIL = 0 341  
                                                              446  
  
                                           Not finalized until 2nd quarter of the adoption year 99 
  
                                           Total 969 
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Table 2 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics of the 969 Sample Firms 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the 969 firms in the final sample. 
 
 
 Mean Std Dev 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Market Capitalization 1    3785.0   20519.5        57.3      320.0    1345.3 
Total Assets 1    9066.9  159921.5      122.3      478.8    1666.7 
Goodwill 1      687.6     4538.7        17.5        76.9      319.0 
Quarterly Goodwill 
Amortization 2          7.5         51.8          0.2           0.8           2.9  
Quarterly Sales Revenue 3      645.8     217.5        27.5      114.4      406.0 
Goodwill/Total Assets  0.208 0.151 0.090 0.168 0.284 
Goodwill Amortization/Sales 
Revenue 4 0.030 0.148 0.003 0.007 0.015 
 
1. Amount as of the adoption date (in millions). 
2. Amount in the first quarter of the year before adoption (in millions). 
3. Amount in the first quarter of the adoption year (in millions). 
4. Two divided by 3. 
 
 
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics of the IIL of the 255 IIL Firms 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the initial impairment loss (IIL) in the 255 IIL firms that completed the transitional 
impairment test and reported a non-zero IIL during the first quarter or second quarter following the adoption of SFAS No. 142. 
 
 
 Mean Std Dev 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
IIL (pre-tax) 1      414.6     3411.9         8.8        36.6      180.0 
IIL (after tax) 1      398.5     3409.3         7.7        30.2      175.8 
IIL (pretax)/Total Assets 0.088 0.092 0.024 0.056 0.125 
IIL (pretax)/Goodwill 0.463 0.349 0.141 0.389 0.772 
 
1. Amount in millions. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel C. Descriptive Statistics of the IIL by Industry 
 
This table reports the industry distribution and size of the initial impairment loss (IIL) of the 870 sample firms that completed the 
the transitional impairment test during the first quarter or second quarter following the adoption of SFAS No. 142. 
 
Number IIL/Total Assets (mean) IIL/Goodwill   (mean)  
Industry Group All IIL firms All IIL firms All IIL firms 
Agriculture and food       15   2 (13%) 1.4%   10.1%    5.4%   40.5% 
Mining and Construction       17   7 (41%) 7.4%   18.0%   19.8%   48.2% 
Textiles and Publishing       71 25 (35%) 2.9%    8.2%   11.8%   33.5% 
Chemicals       34 13 (38%) 2.8%    7.4%   18.6%   48.7% 
Pharmaceuticals       20   4 (20%) 4.0%   20.0%    9.7%   48.6% 
Extractive       12   2 (17%) 1.2%    7.3%    5.0%   29.9% 
Durables Manufacturers     254  81 (32%) 2.7%    8.5%   15.0%   47.1% 
Transportation       52  16 (31%) 2.3%    7.6%   15.4%   50.0% 
Utilities       12   3 (25%) 0.5%    2.1%    3.7%   14.7% 
Retail     117  29 (25%) 2.0%    8.0%   14.8%   60.0% 
Banking/Financial Svc.       46  13 (28%) 1.0%    3.6%   10.7%   37.7% 
Services     117  41 (35%) 3.7%   10.6%   14.5%   41.3% 
Computers     103  19 (18%) 1.8%   10.0%   10.6%   57.5% 
Total     870 255 (29%) 2.6%    8.9%   13.6%   46.3% 
 
Industry membership is determined by the SIC code as follows. Agriculture and food (0100-0999 and 2000-2111), Mining and 
construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399), Textiles and printing/publishing (2200-2799), Chemicals (2800-2824, 2840-
2899), Pharmaceuticals (2830-2836), Extractive (2900-2999, 1300-1399), Durables manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-
3579 and 3670-3679), Transportation (4000-4899), Utilities (4900-4999), Retail (5000-5999), Banking or financial services 
(6000-6999), Services (7000-8999 excluding 7370-7379), and Computers (7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679). 
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 Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics: Earnings Management Test 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables that are used in the multivariate tobit analysis that examines earnings 
management. Of all of the firms (n = 870) that announced their finalized IIL measurement during the first quarter or the second 
quarter following adoption, 255 reported a non-zero IIL charge (IIL firms) and 615 reported no IIL charge (zero-IIL firms).  
 
All firms  
(n = 870) 
IIL firms  
(n = 255) 
Zero-IIL firms  
(n = 615) 
Test of Differences 
(IIL vs. zero-IIL)  
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
IIL    0.026   0        0.089    0.056    0    0      ***     +++ 
SIZE    6.196   6.208    6.729    6.728    5.975    6.014    ***    +++ 
GWA    0.204   0.166    0.227    0.190    0.194    0.157    ***    +++ 
GWR    0.647   0.292    0.290    0.027    0.794    0.413    ***    +++ 
IAPD   -0.103  -0.989    0.384   -0.639   -0.304   -1.154        
IPR&D    0.004   0       0.003    0        0.004    0             
RET1    0.401   0.329    0.345    0.272    0.424    0.351    *    ++ 
RET4   -0.050  -0.052   -0.146   -0.132   -0.010   -0.033     ***    +++ 
ROA1    0.096   0.116    0.085    0.086    0.100    0.125    *    +++ 
ROA4    0.102   0.138    0.113    0.127    0.097    0.144        + 
LEVERAGE    0.284   0.255    0.303    0.276    0.276    0.250    *    ++ 
MGMTΔ     0.157   0       0.235    0         0.125    0       ***     +++ 
 
***, **, *     Difference between the means is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively. 
+++, ++, +   Difference between the medians using the Wilcoxon rank-sum scores is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1  
                      level, respectively 
 
DEFINITIONS  
IIL = Initial goodwill impairment loss deflated by total assets at the beginning of the adoption fiscal year. Measured pre-tax and 
expressed as a positive number. 
SIZE = Log of total assets at the beginning of the adoption year. 
GWA = Goodwill deflated by total assets at the beginning of the adoption year. 
GWR = Excess of the estimated implied fair value of goodwill over the book value of goodwill deflated by total assets. 
IAPD = Industry-adjusted amortization period of goodwill before adoption of SFAS No. 142.  
IPR&D = In-process R&D costs from M&A over the 5 years before adoption deflated by total assets.  
RET1 = Cumulative market-adjusted stock return over the year before adoption.  
RET4 = Average cumulative market-adjusted stock return over -4 to -1 year before adoption.   
ROA1 = ROA over the year before adoption.  
ROA4 = Average ROA over -4 to -1 year before adoption.    
LEVERAGE = Total debts deflated by total assets at the beginning of the adoption year. 
MGMTΔ  = 1 if there was a change in key management over the year before adoption, and 0 otherwise.   
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Table 4 
Multivariate Tobit Analysis: Earnings Management Test 
 
 
This table presents the results of the regression analyses that show the determinants of the amount of the IIL using a tobit 
specification. The parameter estimates are based on the following model. 
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Models 1 and 3 use a sample of 870 firms (255 IIL firms and 615 zero-IIL firms) that had finalized the initial impairment test by 
the second quarter of the adoption year. Model 2 uses a sub-sample of 169 firm observations (55 IIL firms and 114 zero-IIL 
firms) for which details of debt covenants are available. The coefficients on the IND variables are not tabulated.  
 
Model 1 (n = 870) Model 2 (n = 169) Model 3 (n = 870) 
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient 
Chi-
Square 
Stat 
Coefficient 
Chi-
Square 
Stat 
Coefficient 
Chi-
Square 
Stat 
Intercept ?    -0.221    52.30 ***     -0.310    19.75 ***     -0.210    48.64 *** 
IND ?    Included     Included     Included  
SIZE ?     0.016   23.46 ***      0.025   16.73 ***      0.016   23.76 *** 
GWA +     0.262   47.38 ***      0.322   35.39 ***      0.263   47.54 *** 
GWR -    -0.026   19.76 ***     -0.035   14.79 ***     -0.026   20.03 *** 
IAPD +    -0.001     3.39 *     -0.005     1.65      -0.001     3.29 * 
IPR&D -    -0.185     1.54      -0.145     3.30 *      -0.162     1.58  
RET1 -    -0.015     4.24 **     -0.028     8.14 ***     -0.014     4.05 ** 
RET4 -    -0.073   22.70 ***     -0.052   11.87 ***     -0.071   20.57 *** 
ROA1 -    -0.182     8.39 ***     -0.145     4.64 **     -0.169     7.99 *** 
ROA4 -     0.040     1.64     -0.025     1.39      0.035     1.48 
LEVERAGE -    -0.053     4.68 **     -0.028     3.35 *     -0.051     4.75 ** 
LEVERAGE* 
D_Restrict - - -     -0.041     4.63 ** - - 
MGMTΔ  +     0.059    16.78 ***      0.083     12.57 ***      0.051      8.11 *** 
MGMTΔ * 
Involuntary ? - - - -      0.010      1.24  
 
 * Two-tailed probability <0.10.  ** Two-tailed probability < 0.05. *** Two-tailed probability < 0.01. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics: Analysis of the Event Period Return  
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables that are used in the test of the stock market response. A total of 1,764 
two-quarter-pooled observations are used in the analysis. Observations with a share price of below 0.5 dollars in the event period 
are eliminated. Extreme values of all of the variables (less than 1% or greater than 99% of the value of each variable) are 
winsorized to the limiting value.   
 
Percentile  
Variable n Mean Std Dev 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
CAR(-1 to 1)   1,764   0.0050   0.0919  -0.1443  -0.0403   0.0051   0.0494   0.1558 
SURPRISE   1,764  -0.0001   0.0497  -0.0488  -0.0007   0.0005   0.0029   0.0390 
BTM   1,764   0.7166   0.6544   0.1005   0.3279   0.5362   0.8930   1.9031 
SIZE   1,764   5.9581   2.0843   2.4167   4.3830   6.0267   7.3830   9.4162 
BETA   1,764   0.7498   0.5495   0.0502   0.3693   0.6730   1.0029   1.8129 
MOM   1,764   0.2047   0.3721  -0.3924   0.0211   0.1961   0.3780   0.8461 
AMORT   1,764   0.0085   0.0309   0.0003   0.0010   0.0023   0.0055   0.0283 
IIL      799   0.1083       0.4146       0        0        0        0.2203   0.4920 
EIIL1      799  -0.1156   0.1933  -0.4365  -0.1525  -0.0845  -0.0469   0.0505 
EIIL2      799  -0.1205   0.2178  -0.4537  -0.1607  -0.0876  -0.0441   0.0648 
UIIL1      799   0.1879   0.2484   0.0130   0.0618   0.1060   0.2294   0.4956 
UIIL2      799   0.1921   0.2684   0.0020   0.0590     0.1105   0.2336   0.5087 
 
DEFINITIONS  
CAR = Three-day (-1 to +1) market adjusted cumulative return.  
SURPRISE = Earnings surprise in the earnings announcement.   
BTM =Book-to-market ratio.   
SIZE = Log of the market value of equity.   
BETA = Market beta.    
MOM = Market-adjusted stock return for the six months before the earnings announcement.  
AMORT = Increase in quarterly earnings per share that is due to the elimination of goodwill amortization. 
IIL = IIL per share, measured pre-tax and expressed as a positive number. 
EIIL1 = Predicted IIL per share using only the actual impairment proxy variables in Eq. (1). 
EIIL2 = Predicted IIL per share using both the actual impairment and manipulation proxy variables in Eq. (1).   
UIIL1 = ei=IIL - EIIL1 when only the actual impairment proxy variables in Eq. (1) are used. 
UIIL2 = ei=IIL – EIIL2 when both the actual impairment and manipulation proxy variables in Eq. (1) are used.   
All of the independent variables (except BTM, SIZE, BETA, and MOM) are scaled by the share price on day-2. 
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Table 6 
Analysis of the Event Period Return  
 
Panel A. Multivariate Analysis of the Event Period Return 
This table provides the results of the multivariate analysis of the event period return, CAR (-1 to 1). A total of 1,764 two-quarter-
pooled observations are used in the analysis. Observations with a share price of below 0.5 dollars in the event period are 
eliminated. Extreme values of all of the variables (less than 1% or greater than 99% of the value of each variable) are winsorized 
to the limiting value.   
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Model 1 assumes that all of the IIL charge is unanticipated by the market. 
Model 2 assumes that the market formulates an expectation of the IIL using the actual impairment proxies in Eq. (1). 
Model 3 assumes that the market formulates an expectation of the IIL using both the actual and manipulation proxies in Eq. (1). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Variable Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat 
Intercept     0.0049    0.50      0.0028    0.35      0.0022    0.25 
SURPRISE     0.1371    4.58 ***     0.1945    6.66 ***     0.1929    6.73 *** 
BTM     0.0043    1.12        0.0057    1.43        0.0055    1.42    
SIZE    -0.0012   -0.91    -0.0014   -1.11    -0.0015   -1.16 
BETA    -0.0134   -3.22 ***    -0.0132   -3.18 ***    -0.0128   -3.10 *** 
MOM     0.0097    1.62     0.0072    1.25     0.0075    1.27  
AMORT     0.0097    0.13     0.0085    0.11     0.0126    0.23 
IIL    -0.0218   -2.03 ** - - - - 
EIIL1 - -    -0.0195   -0.59 - - 
UIIL1 - -    -0.0526   -3.67 *** - - 
EIIL2 - - - -    -0.0271   -0.84  
UIIL2 - - - -    -0.0507   -3.49 *** 
n 1,764 1.764 1.764 
R2 0.0264 0.0467 0.0435 
F value                6.81 ***                 9.65 ***                 9.43 *** 
 
* Two-tailed probability <0.10.  ** Two-tailed probability < 0.05. *** Two-tailed probability < 0.01. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Analysis of the Event Period Return 
 
Panel B. 1St Quarter Note Disclosure and 2nd Quarter IIL Test Result 
This table compares the nature of the IIL test information that was disclosed in the first quarter 10-Q notes with the actual IIL test 
results that were disclosed in the second quarter for firms that had not finalized the IIL by the first quarter earnings 
announcement. Of the 969 sample firms, 424 finalized the IIL test in the first quarter and 545 firms did not do so. 
 
2Q IIL Disclosure 
Non-zero IIL 1Q Note Disclosure Zero-IIL 
(# of firms) # of firms IIL/TA (mean) 
IIL/GW 
(mean) 
IIL test 
Not finalized  
(# of firms) 
1. “Expect no IIL” (n = 36)          36           0           -           -            0 
2. “Will be no material IIL” (n = 38)          33           3        0.011        0.034           2 
3. “Will be some IIL” (n = 26)           0          12        0.050        0.275         14 
4. “Will be substantial IIL” (n = 25)           0          18        0.135         0.617           7 
 No information provided (n =  420)         272           72        0.067          0.404           76   
  Total (n = 545)         341         105        0.075        0.415          99 
 
Panel C. Analysis of the Event Period Return: Without IIL Information Loss 
This table provides the results of the multivariate analysis of the event period return, CAR (-1 to 1), in which I set DIIL = 0 for the 
second quarter IIL observations if any nature of the IIL test information was disclosed in the first quarter 10-Q notes. A total of 
1,764 two-quarter-pooled observations are used in the analysis. Observations with a share price of below 0.5 dollars in the event 
period are eliminated. Extreme values of all of the variables (less than 1% or greater than 99% of the value of each variable) are 
winsorized to the limiting value.   
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Variable Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat 
Intercept     0.0048    0.49     0.0021    0.22     0.0017    0.14 
SURPRISE     0.1394    4.80 ***     0.1982    6.83 ***     0.1972    6.77 *** 
BTM     0.0033    0.85       0.0061    1.52      0.0063    1.51    
SIZE    -0.0012   -0.92     -0.0014   -1.17    -0.0015   -1.20  
BETA    -0.0137   -3.28 ***    -0.0131   -3.11 ***    -0.0128   -3.23 *** 
MOM     0.0109    1.82 *     0.0091    1.31     0.0082    1.40 
AMORT     0.0318    0.42     0.0245    0.36     0.0226    0.29 
IIL    -0.0247   -2.01 **  - - - - 
EIIL1 - -    -0.0229   -0.85 - - 
UIIL1 - -    -0.0514   -3.01 *** - - 
EIIL2 - - - -    -0.0235   -1.08 
UIIL2 - - - -    -0.0498   -3.32 *** 
n 1,764 1.764 1.764 
R2 0.0274 0.0425 0.0414 
F value                 7.06 ***                 9.41 ***                 9.28 *** 
 
 * Two-tailed probability <0.10.  ** Two-tailed probability < 0.05. *** Two-tailed probability < 0.01. 
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Table 7 
Leverage and the Event Period Return  
 
This table provides the results of the multivariate analysis of the event period return, CAR (-1 to 1), for the low, mid-, and high 
leverage firm groups. Observations with a share price of below 0.5 dollars in the event period are eliminated. Extreme values of 
all of the variables (less than 1% or greater than 99% of the value of each variable) are winsorized to the limiting value.                         
 
Low-leverage firms Mid-leverage firms High-leverage firms  
Variable Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat Coefficient t stat 
Intercept    -0.0085   -0.44   0.0032    0.18     0.0090 0.71 
SURPRISE     0.4412 3.91 ***     0.1950 2.31 **     0.3106 5.33 *** 
BTM     0.0074 0.85 -0.0011 -0.11     0.0079 1.50 
SIZE    -0.0025 1.11        0.0008 0.34       -0.0010 -0.41  
BETA -0.0131 -1.94 *  0.0048    0.63 -0.0222 -2.60 ** 
MOM -0.0066 -0.45     0.0145 1.19     0.0113 1.45 
AMORT    -0.1825   -0.85     0.2189 0.55     0.1889  1.44 
EIIL1    -0.0625   -0.85 -0.0030 -0.22 -0.0018 -0.31 
UIIL1 -0.0248 -1.59  -0.0445 -2.75 ** -0.0582 -3.88 *** 
n 588 588 588 
Mean (debt/TA) 0.060 0.258 0.511 
 R2 0.0338 0.0380 0.0766 
F value                 2.90 ***                 2.87 ***                 7.85 *** 
 
   * Two-tailed probability <0.10.  ** Two-tailed probability < 0.05. *** Two-tailed probability < 0.01. 
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Table 8 
Analyst Forecast Revisions around the IIL Announcement 
 
This table provides the results of the multivariate regressions of the analyst revisions of k quarter ahead (k = 1, 2, or 
3) EPS forecasts around the IIL announcement, using the sub-sample of firms. 
 
iii
k
i IILSURPRISEAFREV εββα +++= 21                                                                      (3) 
iiii
k
i UIILEIILSURPRISEAFREV εβββα ++++= 321                                                      (4) 
 
One Quarter Ahead  
Forecast Revisions 
Two Quarters Ahead 
Forecast Revisions 
Three Quarters Ahead 
Forecast Revisions  
 
Variable 
(5) 
Coefficient 
(t stat) 
(6) 
Coefficient 
(t stat) 
(5) 
Coefficient 
(t stat) 
(6) 
Coefficient 
(t stat) 
(5) 
Coefficient 
(t stat) 
(6) 
Coefficient 
(t stat) 
Intercept -0.0015  (-5.98)*** 
-0.0014 
 (-5.99)*** 
-0.0012 
 (-5.09)*** 
-0.0013 
 (-5.04)*** 
-0.0001 
(-0.78) 
-0.0001 
(-0.80) 
SURPRISE 0.0586 (4.73)*** 
0.0614 
 (4.85)*** 
0.1281 
(6.32)*** 
0.1293 
 (6.41)*** 
    0.0523 
   (2.42)** 
    0.0591 
   (2.70)*** 
IIL -0.0102 (-2.80)*** - 
-0.0135 
(-3.19)*** - 
-0.0059 
(-2.67)*** - 
EIIL1 -  0.0015 (0.53) - 
  -0.0047 
 (-1.42) - 
-0.0025 
(-0.60) 
UIIL1 - -0.0141  (-3.52)*** - 
-0.0149 
 (-4.31)*** - 
-0.0081 
  (-3.14)*** 
R2 0.1023 0.1059 0.1460 0.1598 0.0230 0.0325 
F value  26.26 ***   22.97 *** 39.59 *** 34.70 *** 5.64 ***  6.21 ***  
n 587 583 482 
n (IIL>0) 161 159 133 
 
  * Two-tailed probability <0.10.  ** Two-tailed probability < 0.05. *** Two-tailed probability < 0.01. 
 
DEFINITIONS 
k
iAFREV = Analyst revision of the k quarter ahead (k = 1, 2, or 3) EPS forecast around the IIL announcement.   
 SURPRISE = Earnings surprise in the earnings announcement.  
 IIL = IIL per share, measured pre-tax and expressed as a positive number. 
 EIIL1 = Expected IIL per share using only the actual impairment proxy variables in Eq. (1). 
 UIIL1 = Unexpected IIL per share using only the actual impairment proxy variables in Eq. (1).   
 All of the variables are scaled by the share price at the end of the fiscal quarter. 
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